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The subsidiarity principle was formally adopted in 1992 by the European Union to limit excessive
centralization of competences. According to the subsidiarity test, a given policy responsibility should be
allocated to the lowest possible level of government, unless there is evidence that the central government
(the Union) has a comparative advantage in fulfilling the task under consideration. Contrary to its
stated goal, the adoption of the subsidiarity principle was followed by a wave of intense centralization.
In this paper, we address this paradox by studying the effects and the limitations of the subsidiarity test
in promoting an optimal level of centralization.

1. INTRODUCTION
According to a fundamental principle of constitutional design, powers should be
allocated to the level of government that can best exercise them (Parisi, 2003). This
canon of constitutional design provides the underlying rationale for the
subsidiarity principle, which guides the allocation of competences between the
central government (union or federation) and the local (state) governments (Parisi,
2003:110). The subsidiarity principle tackles a fundamental question of federalism.
The principle is applied to verify whether competences are optimally allocated
between federal governments and states. The principle does this by looking at the
comparative advantage of different levels of government in fulfilling specific
* We would like to dedicate this article to the memory of “nonna” Elena Albertini. We would also
like to thank for their valuable comments and criticisms Graziella Bertocchi, Luigi Brighi, David
Dana, Peter DiCola, David D. Haddock, Eugene Kontorovich, Giuseppe Marotta, Jonathan Nash,
Hila Nevo, Max Schanzenbach, Wolfgang Weigel, and the participants at the 25th Annual Conference
of the European Law and Economics Association (Haifa, September, 2008), the 8th Annual
Conference of the Midwestern Law and Economics Association (Chicago, October, 2008), the 4th
Annual Conference of the Italian Law and Economics Association (Bologna, November, 2008), the
Faculty Workshop at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Department of Economics.
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functions (Parisi, 2003). In a nutshell, the subsidiarity principle states that the
reallocation of functions to the central level should be permitted only if the
reallocation brings added value over and above what member states or individuals
could achieve by acting at the local level (the so-called “subsidiarity test”).1
There is a flourishing economic and legal literature examining the concept of
subsidiarity as an instrument for achieving an optimal level of centralization of
policy responsibilities (for a comprehensive analysis, see Inman and Rubinfeld,
1998). This literature focuses on the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of
centralization. In the law and economics literature, Kirchner (1997) studied the
effects of subsidiarity by comparing it to the alternative of fixed competence
catalogues. Kirchner concluded that subsidiarity was overly static in its nature.
Another relevant contribution to this field is Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2005).
According to their paper, the main benefit of centralization is the possibility of
exploiting economies of scale through the central allocation of policy
responsibilities. The paper characterizes the costs of centralization as the result
of the heterogeneity of preferences across the member states: one size does not
necessarily fit all. Balancing the benefits from economies of scale with the
varying preferences of the citizenry, the optimal degree of centralization should
ensure that all activities in which economies of scale are predominant are
carried out at the central level, whereas all activities with high heterogeneity of
preferences are carried out at the local level. In a related paper, Alesina,
Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005) provide empirical evidence on the expansion
of the policy-making role of the European Union (EU) in the years between
1971 and 2000. They found that the range of competences attributed to the
central level (for instance to the European Commission, to the Parliament, or
to the Court of Justice) has expanded markedly, “far away from the EEC’s
original mandate,” which only established a free market zone and harmonized
trade policy. Moreover, they found that in the European Union, the allocation
of policy responsibilities has become unbalanced and now varies from the
optimal balance of economies of scale and the heterogeneity of preferences
defined in the previous literature.
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by providing a formal model of
subsidiarity to unveil the particular features of the centralization process triggered
by application of this principle. We study the optimal allocation of policy
functions in multi-level governments, discussing the interplay between economies
1 As Inman and Rubinfeld (1998), define it, “subsidiarity is a principle of governance designed
to give meaning to the divisions of power and responsibility between the central government and
constituent states in a federal system. The principle seeks to allocate responsibilities for policy
formation and implementation to the lowest level of government at which the objectives of that
policy can be successfully achieved.”
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of scale, economies of scope and heterogeneity of preferences. We distinguish
three alternative forms of subsidiarity (centralized, decentralized and democratic)
and develop an economic model to understand the process of progressive
centralization triggered by these principles. The frameworks of the previous
literature on the optimal level of centralization have been static, i.e., the structure
of costs did not change over time. In contrast, our model is dynamic such that the
structure of costs evolves according to previous centralization decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the
subsidiarity principle and of its main characteristics. In Section 3 we introduce
a simple model to illustrate the optimal choice of governmental activities when
states choose independently at the local level. In Section 4 we consider how the
optimal supply of governmental activities changes when the competences are
centralized at the federal or union level. We use these results to consider the
optimal allocation of competences between local and central levels of
government. We distinguish three forms of subsidiarity and consider the
impact of these alternative decision rules on the process of centralization.
Section 5 models the centralization process under subsidiarity by which
competences can be lumped together. We observe the possibility of lock-in
effects when subsidiarity is applied in the early stage of centralization. This is
because economies of scope are largest when all functions are concentrated at
one level. The first functions that are moved from the local to the central level
suffer higher losses in terms of forgone economies of scope. In Section 6 we
address the puzzle of self-defeating subsidiarity and consider the application of
the subsidiarity test for proposed devolution of competences. We explain the
puzzling increase in centralization observed after the adoption of the
subsidiarity principle, showing that the effects of subsidiarity are possibly
reversed if the test is introduced after several functions have been previously
centralized. This occurred in the European Union where the subsidiarity
principle was formally adopted after several important functions had already
been allocated at the central level through political decision-making and
without a blueprint for expansion. We further show that the problem of
excessive centralization is potentially solved when subsidiarity is used to test
the desirability of previous centralization decisions, leading to a possible
devolution of competences. Section 7 concludes with some policy
considerations and suggestions for possible extensions.
The main contribution of the paper is to show the critical role of timing in the
application of subsidiarity. The interplay between economies of scale and scope (at
the local and central levels) can create lock-in effects and problems of excessive
centralization at different stages of the centralization process. Lock-in effects may
be observed when the process of centralization (or, for this matter,
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1375
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decentralization) is stalled at a local, rather than global, optimum. We further show
that the likelihood of these lock-in effects changes when multiple competences can
be bundled and reallocated together. Problems of excessive centralization may be
observed when subsidiarity is introduced after an initial phase of centralization.
Here, the subsidiarity test may have perverse effects, favoring further centralization
rather than putting a limit to it, with path-dependent effects on later centralization
decisions. The paper further discusses the different effects of alternative forms of
subsidiarity when states have heterogeneous preferences. We consider the role of
alternative cost-sharing rules to allow for convergence of centralization decisions of
heterogeneous states. These results shed some light on the desirability (or lack
thereof) of alternative interpretations of the subsidiarity principle to allow optimal
levels of (de)centralization.

1. THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
The concept of subsidiarity has ancient roots2 and has been used by many
politicians and political theorists such as Althusius, Montesquieu, Locke,
Tocqueville and Abraham Lincoln (Carozza, 2003). The Articles of
Confederation, created by the United States in 1781, relied heavily on the
subsidiarity principle, resulting in deference toward state government over a
federal government.3 In the nineteenth century the concept of subsidiarity reemerged in political thought as an alternative to the competing claims of
decentralized capitalism and centralized Marxist socialism.4 The major concern
at the time was to protect society against the rise of totalitarianism. Subsidiarity
was viewed as an instrument to combat the inexorable forces of progressive
centralization, known as Popitz’s law.5 In the 1930s the concept of subsidiarity
gradually evolved into a principle advocating a cooperative balance between the

2 Some historians trace the concept of subsidiarity back to classical Greece. Subsidiarity made a
new appearance in the Middle Ages, taken up by Thomas Aquinas and medieval scholasticism.
3 See Bermann, (1994:331), comparing protection of Member State sovereignty pursuant to the
subsidiarity principle to the political safeguards of U.S. federalism. See also, Wechsler (1954),
which argues that the structural representation of state interests in the institutions of the federal
government make it unnecessary for the judiciary to independently protect state interests. For a
later expansion and restatement of the analysis, see Choper (1980).
4 Catholic social theorists started to apply the concept of subsidiarity to social life at the end of
the nineteenth century. In 1891 Pope Leo XIII included the subsidiarity principle in his
encyclical “Rerum Novarum.”
5 According to Johannes Popitz (1927:348-49), “in a realistic consideration of politics, the power of
attraction of the central government becomes inevitable. There is no effective panacea against it.”
This hypothesis was pronounced so emphatically by Popitz as to become known as “Popitz‘s law.”
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state and the civil society, setting limits on centralized authority and protecting
various social groups from failures of the state.6
In the following we provide a brief history of the events that led to the
adoption of subsidiarity as a constitutional principle of the European Union
through the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

1.1. CENTRALIZATION OF COMPETENCES PRIOR TO THE SUBSIDIARITY
PRINCIPLE
The distribution of powers between the central government of the Union and
member states has been one of the most contentious points throughout the
history of the European Union. Since the early years of the European
Economic Community (created through the Treaty of Rome in 1958), member
states have resisted the expansion of activities and the progressive
centralization of competences at the Community level.7 Although the original
intention was that the Community could obtain the transfer of competences by
the member states only on the basis of limited special authorization (German
doctrine of “begrenzte Einzelermächtigung”), this fell apart in practice. In practice,
the reallocation of competences took place on a merely political basis via a
broad interpretation of the EC Treaty. Everling (1997) provides a number of
examples of reallocation of competences that were hardly warranted by the
original treaty provisions. One such example was the creation of more than
twenty organizations entrusted with a variety of powerful intervention
instruments. Examples of these instruments included production quotas, aids
or levies, special monetary systems, and rules for product quality. The legal
basis for the creation of these organizations was found in a small subparagraph
of Article 37 of the EC Treaty governing agricultural policy. Another example
concerned the implementation of Articles 94 and 95 of the EC Treaty which
6 The perspective on subsidiarity changed markedly in the 1930s. In a famous passage of his
“Quadragesimo Anno” Pius XI wrote “the more faithfully this subsidiarity principle function is
followed and a graded hierarchical order exists among the various associations, the greater also
will be both social authority and social efficiency, and the happier and more prosperous too will
be the condition of the commonwealth” (Bermann, 1994). It seems that originally subsidiarity
was not seen as a way to achieve social efficiency or as an instrument for political compromise,
reasons for which it was later included in the Treaty on the European Union. Rather, subsidiarity
was and is primarily a declaration about the inherent and inalienable dignity of individual human
beings. It reflects the belief that the individual should be “ontologically and morally prior to the
state or other social groupings” (Carozza, 2003:42). See also Vittadini (2007).
7
The 1958 Treaty of Rome articulated the principal goals of the European Community in
Article 2, and specified the instruments for the achievement of these goals in Article 3. These
two articles laid the boundaries of the original competence of the Community, consisting in the
creation of a common market and the harmonization of related policies.

DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1375

746 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

5:1, 2009

led to a de facto reallocation of the lawmaking authority for national economic
law to the central powers of the Community. As pointed out by Everling, this
wave of centralization found little constraint within the Community rules.
Article 308 of the EC Treaty authorized the Council to decide if actions by the
Community were necessary to achieve one of its objectives, in practice making
it possible for the Community to reallocate state competences to itself.
The resistance of member states to centralization grew stronger after the 1986
Single European Act, which strengthened the powers of Community
institutions and opened new fields of activity in areas such as research, finance,
economic convergence, social policy and environment. The momentum
generated by the Single European Act and the end of the Cold War led to
intergovernmental conferences exploring the new boundaries of a political,
economic and monetary union – efforts which culminated in the Maastricht
Treaty (Marquardt, 1994). In the face of such growing expansion of competences,
member states demanded a more restrictive interpretation of the original
treaties and the introduction of constraints to new proposals for centralization.
European leaders stressed the role of subsidiarity in balancing central and state
powers and constraining unwarranted centralization in an attempt to assuage
the fears and the skepticism voiced by several member states.8

1.1. THE ADOPTION OF THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
The subsidiarity principle was formally adopted in 1992 by the Treaty of the
European Union (Treaty of Maastricht, signed on 7 February 1992, entered
into force on 1 November 1993). The subsidiarity principle is currently
codified in Article 5 of the consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community9 and is also included in the proposed European
Constitution, under Article 9.10
8 Bermann (1994:332) observes that, all in all, “the institutional support for a theory of political
safeguards of subsidiarity in the European Community is not very impressive. Despite
appearances, neither the Council of Ministers nor the Parliament is structured to ensure that
political decisions on any given issue are made at the lowest level of government possible.” On a
similarly skeptical note, Marquardt (1994) observes that subsidiarity provided a useful cover to
national politicians (such as John Major, who relied heavily on the principle in his public
speeches) all of which were facing Euro-skeptical criticism of Maastricht in their home states.
The Edinburgh summit of December 1992 gave additional content to subsidiarity in the hope to
facilitate the critical moment surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The Summit
issued a detailed communiqué, specifying that all institutions of the Union were to use a test of
subsidiarity as a condition precedent to their policy action, giving the European Court of Justice
some role in ensuring compliance with the principle.
9 Art. 5 of the Treaty reads “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred
upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall
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The institutions of the European Union have struggled with the interpretation
and implementation of the subsidiarity principle. In the Edinburgh summit of
December 1992, the European Council provided some clarification on the
meaning of subsidiarity, specifying that action at the central level should be
carried out only upon evidence of clear benefits of scale or effectiveness when
compared to the independent action of member states. The Council stressed
that the conclusions reached by the organs of the Union on matters of
subsidiarity were to be substantiated by qualitative or quantitative analyses
(Marquardt, 1994). Despite these attempts at clarifying its meaning, the subsidiarity
principle remains an obscure concept, lacking formal guidelines for its
implementation, in the opinion of both scholars and policymakers.
The lack of a formalization of the subsidiarity test has engendered much
skepticism about the real utility of this principle in providing a principled
constraint to the process of progressive centralization of the European Union.
As pointed out by van den Bergh (1997): “Because law on its own does not
provide sufficiently accurate and reliable standards for evaluating the effects of
legal rules, economic theory must be incorporated into the legal analysis. …
The wording of Article 5(2) itself invites an economic analysis: to justify the
exercise of powers by European Community institutions ‘the scale or effects of
the proposed action’ must be taken into account. This formulation allows for
the consideration of scale economies and externalities; both factors are
powerful efficiency arguments in favor of centralization.”
In the following, we take up this challenge. We address the question of how
the subsidiarity principle should be constructed and applied in practice in order
to ensure an effective safeguard for the sovereignty of individual states and to
promote cooperation and intervention of superior hierarchical layers when
efficient.11 Our simple model of subsidiarity strives to unpack the loaded
within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.” On the justiciable
nature of Article 5, see Edwards (1996).
10 Art. 9 of the proposed European Constitution states: “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and insofar as
the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States,
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”
11 As effectively put by Carozza (2003), subsidiarity is, in itself, a paradoxical principle since it is
instituted to limit the intervention of higher layers of hierarchy, yet it also justifies those very
interventions.
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concept of “comparative advantage of the central government” by providing
an economic framework for the subsidiarity test. We add economies of scope
to the standard analysis. Economies of scope are economies that arise when
there is an advantage in administering or producing sets of services within the
same governmental unit rather than in each service separately. Adding
economies of scope to the usual analysis introduces a potential “lumpiness” or
non-linearity into the subsidiarity decision. The efficiency performance of
overall government may be lowered when an important service is moved to the
central government without its productive counterpart. When economies of
scope are included in the analysis, a centralization decision under subsidiarity
should be made globally by examining all combinations of services and not
simply by making assignments separately, service by service, as is the usual
approach to reallocation of governmental competences. The analysis seeks to
balance the competing aims of the subsidiarity principle and to bring reason to
the alternative political and philosophical perspectives on subsidiarity.12

2. BASIC MODEL: THE CASE OF DECENTRALIZED
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
In this section, we consider the optimal choice of governmental activities when
local governments can independently choose the quantity or quality of their
governmental activity while taking into account their own heterogeneous
preferences. Once we have found the optimal solution to the local
government’s problem, we can use this solution to characterize the maximal
payoffs when the states operate in a fully decentralized fashion. These results
will be used in Section 4 to model the states’ and the union’s centralization
decisions under three alternative forms of subsidiarity.
In our model, we make three assumptions. The first two assumptions concern
economies of scale and economies of scope. We assume the presence of both
economies of scale and economies of scope in the provision and/or enforcement
of two or more governmental activities. Third, we assume the heterogeneity of
preferences of the member states over governmental goods.13 When considering
12 Political scientists and philosophers frequently disagree on the proper way to apply the principle,
and, when applied in different ways, the subsidiarity principle can have very different outcomes.
13 The problem of heterogeneity of preferences arises at two different levels: first, within a
given nation state and second at a supranational level upon aggregation of the preferences of the
diverse states in the group. According to well-known canons of methodological individualism,
individual actors have preferences but institutions and states do not. For the purpose of the
present analysis, we assume that preferences may be heterogeneous across nation states as a
proxy for the differences of individual preferences within each state.
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centralization decisions in Section 4, we allow for the fact that there may be
unequal apportionment of the central government’s costs among the member
states, i.e., some states may pay a proportionate share of the costs. The
comparison of the cost functions of local and central governments allows us to
identify which level of government has a “cost advantage” in carrying out a given
function. Also in Section 4, we will evaluate the impact of states’ heterogeneity of
preferences on centralization decisions under the subsidiarity principle.
In our framework, economies of scale are present when the cost of producing
an additional unit of governmental output (i.e., the marginal cost) decreases as
the volume of output (i.e., the scale of production) increases. In our model,
economies of scale can be observed at both local and central (supranational)
levels. When the economies of scale at the central level are larger than those at
the local level, centralization yields lower costs. In Definition 1 below, we refer
to this situation as the “cost advantage” of the central government. According
to the empirical evidence, there appears to be a cost advantage in having
central government in the areas of market policies, monetary policy, and
environmental protection (Alesina, Angeloni and Etro, 2005). The cost advantage in
these areas arises due to positive externalities in the local provision of
governmental goods. When policies are formulated at the central level, the
externalities are fully internalized and governmental action is more easily
carried out at the optimal level. Breton and Scott (1978) had previously
formulated a similar argument focusing on cost minimization of services.
Economies of scope are present when the supply of two or more governmental
activities together costs less or is more effective than providing them separately.
Typically, economies of scope are present when one policy responsibility requires
some fixed resource that can also be used for another policy responsibility at no
additional cost. In our framework, the concept of economies of scope also
includes situations in which governmental activities are structurally dependent on
one another and can be more effectively carried out at the same level of
government. For example, the centralization of monetary policy in the European
Central Bank has greatly reduced the degrees of freedom and the effectiveness of
fiscal policy at the national level (Stephan, Parisi and Depoorter, 2003). We suggest that
economies of scope are likely to be present in many policy areas. For instance, the
regulation of the banking and insurance sectors may share many common fixed
and infrastructure costs and scope economies may be present (e.g., a centralized
enforcement agency can effectively monitor these two sectors at a lower cost than
enforcement by multiple, local entities). Although governments occasionally
handle this problem by grouping relevant services into broader functional
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categories, we can identify several functions in which scope economies exist.14 In
our estimation it seems plausible that, in a given policy area, governmental
activities (like administration, enforcement, regulation, etc.) may be characterized
by economies of scope.
The heterogeneity of states’ preferences plays an important role in our model of
subsidiarity.15 States may differ in their preferences pertaining to the quantity or
quality of governmental goods because of many reasons unique to that state, such
as the average income level, ethnic background, race, or religion of their
population.16 This heterogeneity may lead to heightened difficulties in coming to a
consensus on the optimal level of centralization of governmental functions. Large
unions may be characterized by a larger spread in the distribution of preferences
concerning the desired quality or quantity of public goods, and local governments
are likely to have an informational advantage about their citizens’ preferences: a
higher degree of heterogeneity hence tilts the balance in favor of decentralization.
These three assumptions previously identified in the literature play a critical
role in the process of centralization through subsidiarity.17 We consider the
trade-off between economies of scale, economies of scope and heterogeneity
of preferences, studying how the subsidiarity test selects different equilibria
with respect to centralization levels.

2.1. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
We consider a federation or union of states (like the European Union), composed
of a finite number of member states. Analytically the federation or union is
composed of N states, indexed with the subscript i = 1,..., N . Member states
14 Cooperative arrangements, such as those referred to as “marble-cake” federalism, indicate
the presence of economies of scope. Synergies between national and local providers of services
(e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police bodies) can on some occasions be
handled through ad hoc coordination (e.g., a joint task force). Such arrangements impose costs
that could be avoided by aggregating such competences.
15 The issue of heterogeneity of preferences has been investigated from a variety of
perspectives. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) show that the quality of
government is higher in less fragmented societies; Easterly and Levine (1997) show that lower
growth levels are experienced in more ethnically fragmented nations.
16 Ethnic fragmentation is regarded as an important source of heterogeneity of state
preferences: Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) point out that ethnic fragmentation appears to be
quite important in the European context and conclude in favor of decentralization.
17 Empirical analysis investigates the role of the three factors. Among others, Mazzaferro and
Zanardi (2008) show, using a sample of European countries in a median voter framework, that
centralization dominates decentralization for a number of public expenditure programs
(healthcare, education, unemployment benefits), even in the absence of economies of scale and
interregional spillovers.
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have different preferences and different valuations of governmental public goods.
Hereinafter, we will refer to the union or federation as the “central level” (labeled
with C ) and the member state as the “local level” (labeled with L ).
Each state i chooses the level of activities to be supplied for each
governmental competence j , g ij , where g ij characterizes the quantity or
quality of the goods or services inherent in governmental activity j (say, higher
education or defense). We assume that there is a set of M governmental
activities, j = 1,..., M . Let g i = (g i1,..., g ij, ..., g iM ) be the vector 1 xM of
governmental activities levels chosen by state i . Each state i sustains a cost
C L ( gi ) to supply g i . The total cost of state i ’s fulfillment of its
governmental activities is equal to the sum of the costs incurred to supply all
goods and services inherent to its governmental activities j = 1,..., M , i.e.:
M

(1)

C L ( gi ) = ∑ C Lj ( gi1 ,..., gij ,..., giM )
j =1

Each member state is characterized by the following welfare function:18
(2)

Wi = α i H ( g i ) − C L ( g i )
M

where H ( g i ) =

∑ H (g

ij )

and is the state i ’s total benefit from the provision of

j =1

its M governmental activities, where H g j > 0 and H g j g j < 0 . The parameter α i
captures the heterogeneity of preferences across states, indicating how much each
state i values the provision of governmental public goods.19 With no loss of
generality we assume that the parameters α i are observable and member states
within the union can be ordered such that α i ≤ α 2 ≤ L ≤ α N .
The union and its member states have to decide whether policy responsibilities
should be allocated at the central or local level. In the following, we model the
18 This formulation is analogous to the formulation used by in Alesina, Angeloni and Etro
(2005), with the use of a representative agent. However, we have chosen to use states’ aggregate
welfare functions to facilitate the reader’s understanding and to allow an easier comparison of
states’ benefits and costs in the fulfillment of their governmental activities.
19 For the purpose of the present analysis we refer to state’s preferences as a proxy for the
aggregate preferences of the population within each state. Further analysis should consider the
effect of subsidiarity and decentralized policymaking on individuals that are imperfectly
represented within their state’s political system.
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centralization (or decentralization) decision, starting from a situation in which all
governmental activities are initially carried out by states at the local level. When
deciding whether to centralize, states compare the possible cost advantages of
centralization with the forgone economies of scope at the local level and the
adjustment costs due to heterogeneity of preferences.20

3.2. THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE FULLY DECENTRALIZED CASE
In a fully decentralized environment, each state i independently chooses
g i= (g i1,..., g ij, ..., g iM) , the level of governmental activity j to maximize its welfare:
(3)

max( gi1 ,..., gi j ,..., giM )Wi = α i ∑ j =1 H ( gij ) − ∑ j =1 C jL ( gi1 ,..., gi j ,..., gi M )
M

M

The first order conditions are:21
(4)

α i H j = C jjL + ∑ v ≠ j C vL
j ; j = 1,..M

where H j =

∂H ( g ij )
∂gij

and C kL
j =

∂CkL ( g i1 ,..., g ij ,..., g iM )
∂g ij

.

* ) and the vector 1 x M consisting of the
Define g i* = ( g i*1 ,..., g ij* ,..., g iM
optimal quantity of governmental activity j for each state i (i.e., such that the
M first order conditions are simultaneously satisfied). Not surprisingly, g i* is
chosen such that the weighted marginal benefit of supplying an additional unit
of function j for state i is equal to the marginal cost of producing one more
unit of function j .
It should be noted that there are two terms that determine the total marginal
cost of activity j: the first term C jjL represents the direct marginal cost of carrying
M

out activity j , while the term ∑ C

kL
j

v≠ j

represents the indirect marginal cost effect of

producing j on the other governmental activities carried out by the state. These
two arguments of the cost function will help us characterize the economies of
20 In the present model adjustment costs are therefore endogenous. In previous work, we
considered the impact of exogenous adjustment costs on the process of progressive
centralization under the subsidiarity test (Carbonara, Luppi and Parisi, 2009).
21 The second order condition of the maximization problem is satisfied under the assumption

that α H >
i
jj

M

∑C
k =1

kL
jj

. Note that H jj < 0 .
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scale and scope of the governmental activity of state i. As stated above,
economies of scale are present when there are decreasing marginal costs C jjL .22
Economies of scope are captured by the indirect marginal effects of an
activity on the cost of carrying out the other activities, C vL
j . It is now possible
to prove the following properties of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1: (a) The optimal vector of public goods g *iL= (g *i1L,..., gij*L, ..., g *iML ) is
increasing in α i ; (b) Under the full decentralization regime, with
α1 ≤ ... ≤ α i ≤ ... ≤ α N , W1* L ≤ ... ≤ Wi * L ≤ ... ≤ W N* L .
Proof: Part (a) follows from the first order conditions in (4). Part (b)
follows from the properties of the equilibrium vector gi*L and from the
Envelope Theorem.
We can immediately see that Property (a) of the equilibrium has a fairly
straightforward interpretation which plays an important role in the analysis that
follows. Countries with a higher intensity of preference for governmental
activities (high values of α i ) are more willing to provide public goods when
choosing at the local level than are countries with a lower intensity of
preference for governmental activities.

4. CENTRALIZING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS:
THE SUBSIDIARITY TEST
In this section, we build on the previous analysis to explain how the subsidiarity
test works in an economic framework. We model the decision to allocate policy
responsibilities either at a local or central level according to the subsidiarity
principle. As argued above, the optimal allocation of competences between local
and central levels of government can be thought of in terms of cost advantages
due to economies of scale and economies of scope. When transferring
competences from one level of government to another, economies of scope
signify that if one or more competences are shifted to the central level, the cost of
carrying out the remaining activities at the local level will be greater.23
In order to study the decision process for the allocation of competences
between local and central levels, we begin in Section 4.1 by defining the welfare
Decreasing marginal costs guarantee that average costs are always decreasing.
Given that we assume economies of scope both at the local and at the central levels, the
same logic applies when decentralizing some functions, as discussed in section 6.2.
22
23
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function of the union or federation. In Section 4.2 we characterize the
centralization decision under three alternative forms of subsidiarity.

4.1. THE UNION
In the general case, some governmental activities are allocated at the central level
and some others at the local level. Let us assume that the set of governmental
activities allocated at the central level has cardinality k ,24 where 1 ≤ k ≤ M . The
union of member states chooses the level of each governmental activity j that it
carries out at the central level, g Cj , j = 1,..., k where g Cj characterizes the
quantity or quality of the goods or services inherent to activity j supplied by the
central government to each member state. The aggregate level supplied by the
union equals Ng Cj , where N is the number of member states in the union. Let
g C = ( g1C ,..., g kC ) be the vector 1xk of governmental activity levels chosen by
the union for each single state (e.g., education, defense or environmental
C
regulation) and let Ng = ( Ng1C ,..., Ng kC ) be the vector 1xk of aggregate levels

provided by the union.
The total cost sustained by the central government is C C ( Ng C ) , which is
equal to the sum of the costs that the union incurs in order to carry out all the
governmental activities allocated at the central level j = 1,..., k :
K

(5)

C C ( Ng C ) = ∑ C Cj ( Ng1C ,..., NgiC ,..., Ng kC )
j =1

As discussed above, the decision to allocate a specific activity at the central
level or to keep it at the local level is driven by the interplay of two
countervailing incentives: economies of scale versus economies of scope. The
cost function of the union is characterized by the presence of economies of
scale: economies that can be exploited by concentrating the local competences

Without loss of generality, we assume that the functions allocated at the central level are the first
k functions out of M and the remaining M–k remain at the local level. The assumption is only
needed for expositional clarity but is not critical for our results, since we are not assuming the
existence of any particular joint impact of the functions on the union and state cost functions.
24
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to the central level.25 This implies that, for any activity j = 1,..., k , the marginal
jC
jC
cost C j will be decreasing, i.e. C j j < 0 .

Definition 1: The Union has a cost advantage with respect to a member State when:
(6)

C jjL ( g )
C jjC ( g )

>1

In our setting, the presence of a cost advantage implies that for any given
state i , the allocation of competences to the central level yields lower per-unit
costs than the allocation of competences at the local level. The cost advantage
may be due to economies of scale, to the use of different technologies, or to
institutional settings that affect production costs.26
It is possible that some of the activities for which the central government has
a cost advantage are best done in conjunction with other activities at the same
level of government (economies of scope). As with the local economies of
scope discussed in Section 3.2, economies of scope at the central level are
captured by the indirect marginal effects of an activity on the cost of carrying
out the other activities, C vC
j .
It follows immediately that in case of a centralization of k governmental
activities, each state benefits from the provision of k competences chosen at
the central level, and M −k competences that remain chosen at the local level.
The vector of governmental activities of state i is therefore given by these two
D )
categories of competences g i = ( g1C ,K g kC , g ikD+1 ,K, g iM
, where the
subvector ( g1C ,..., g kC ) of dimension 1xk represents the centrally-supplied
governmental activities which is equal for all states, and the subvector
D )
( g ikD+1 ,K, g iM
of dimension 1 x ( M −k ) represents the locally-supplied
governmental activities which are individually chosen by each member state.
25 One argument most often brought forward in support of centralization and harmonization is
that producing public services at the central level results in economies of scale, thus reducing the
overall cost of carrying out that specific activity. See Schäfer (2006). The idea of economies of
scale is also included in Art. 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty),
stating that the Community must demonstrate the need to interfere at the local level by proving
the existence of either “economies of scale or cross-border externalities.”
26 For instance, there is evidence that economies of scale are best exploited at the central level
in areas like common market policies, monetary policy, and environmental protection (Alesina,
Angeloni and Schuknecht, 2005:276).
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This means that each state will locally provide the M −k decentralized
functions, and will face a direct local cost for the supply of those governmental
activities. Each state will also bear a share s i of the union’s cost of providing
the k centralized activities, C C ( Ng C ) , where such shares can be freely
assessed in our model using any number of methods (e.g., equal shares, shares
that are proportional to the costs pertaining to a given member state, shares
based on population or political factors, etc.). The sharing rule s i has an
impact on the individual states’ welfare and their centralization choices under
the democratic and decentralized subsidiarity tests discussed in Sections 4.2.2
and 4.2.3. However, the sharing rule does not have any effect on the aggregate
welfare of states or on the centralization choice undertaken under the
centralized subsidiarity test discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Given the sharing rule s i , state i ’s welfare function can be expressed as:

Wi = α i H ( gi ) − C L ( giD ) − si ∑ j =1 C Cj ( Ng1C ,..., NgiC , ..., Ng kC )
k

(7)

where the vector of governmental
D )
g i = ( g1C ,K g kC , g ikD+1 ,K, g iM
.

activities

of

state

i

is

We construe the welfare function of the union as the Kaldor-Hicks
summation of the welfare functions of the N member states in the union,
which can be written as follows:
N

W C = ∑ [α i H ( g i ) − C L ( g iD )] − C C ( Ng C )

(8)

i =1

N

since

∑S =1 .
i

i=1

*D ) as the vector
Define g i*C = ( g1*C , K g k*C , g ik*D+1 , K, g iM
1 xM of optimal
quantities supplied by state i for each (centralized and decentralized) activity j .
The subvector ( g1*C ,..., g k*C ) of dimension 1xk is chosen at the central level
by the union in order to solve the union’s maximization problem:

max ( g C ,..., g C ) W C ( g )
1

k
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*D ) of dimension
and the subvector ( g ik*D+1 , K , g iM
1 x ( M −k ) for the
competences remaining at decentralized level is chosen by each country in a
separate maximization problem:

max ( g D

D
ik +1 ,..., g iM

) Wi ( g i )

where Wi ( gi ) is defined according to equation (7) and W C (g ) according to
equation (8).
The optimization problem for the central government and for each member
state i for cases of partial centralization of k competences requires the
satisfaction of the following first order conditions:
N

(9)

∑α H
i

j

( gijC ) = NC jjL ( Ng1*C ,..., Ng *NC ) + N

i =1

k

∑

*C
*C
C vL
j (Ng1 ,..., Ng k ); j = 1,..., k

v =1,v ≠ j

(10) α i H j ( gij*D ) = C jjL ( gi* D ) + ∑ v ≠ j C vj L ( gi*D ); j = k + 1,..., M ; i = 1,..., N
If we compare the first order conditions of this partial centralization case to
those observed in (4) for the case of full decentralization, we can observe that
the centralization of the k activities leads to a loss of economies of scope at
the local level. Some new economies of scope, however, are created at the
central level. Since economies of scope are largest when all functions are
concentrated at one level or the other, the economies of scope gained at the
central level will be growing with k . As will be shown later in Section 5, the
trade-off between economies of scope at the local and central levels plays an
important role in the creation of lock-in effects.
In Section 4.2, we will further show that the equilibrium in the case of partial
centralization depends on which version of the subsidiarity test is adopted. We
will provide a full characterization of these partial centralization equilibria in
Section 5. Under the subsidiarity test, each member state evaluates whether it is
more convenient to allocate k activities at the central level or to keep those
activities at the local level. In what follows we are going to explain the
functioning of subsidiarity test, with reference to the optimization problems
introduced above.

4.2. HOW THE SUBSIDIARITY TEST WORKS
Having introduced all the elements of our simple model, we shall now provide
a formalization of the subsidiarity test, on the basis of which states decide
whether to reallocate some of their governmental functions from the local to
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1375
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the central level. The subsidiarity test evaluates the benefits and the costs of
reallocating a given activity from local to central governments. In our
simplified environment, the test consists in the application of a cost-benefit
analysis to assess the optimal level of allocation of a given activity.27
The subsidiarity test can be carried out directly by the central government at the
federal or union level (“centralized subsidiarity test”) or individually by member
states under a unanimity rule (“decentralized subsidiarity test”) or majority rule
(“democratic subsidiarity test”). These three alternative decision rules will be
discussed in Sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.3. When states have heterogeneous
preferences, outcomes are likely to be different in the three cases. As we will show
in Section 5.2, a decentralized subsidiarity test is generally more restrictive than the
other two forms of subsidiarity. The effects of centralized and democratic
subsidiarity may vary according to the placement of the median state’s preferences
relative to the average preferences of all states.

4.2.1. Case 1: Centralized Subsidiarity Test
We begin considering the case of centralized subsidiarity, where the test is
performed at the central level. This is equivalent to the case of centralized
federalism as defined by Inman and Rubinfeld (1998).
Assuming that the central government is planning to centralize k activities,
the subsidiarity test can be written analytically as follows:
(11)

W U ( g *C ) ≥ ∑ i =1Wi ( g i* L )
N

where g *C = ( g1*C , K , g i*C , K , g *NC ) ' represents the N vectors of each state’s
governmental activities. Under this form of subsidiarity, centralization will take
place if it improves the aggregate well being of all member states.

4.2.2. Case 2: Decentralized Subsidiarity Test
The situation would be inherently different under a test of decentralized
subsidiarity, where the test is performed at the local level by member states.28
27

See Pelkmans (2006). In the specific EU context, the test comprises a number of steps,
including an analysis of whether a given activity falls within the area of shared competences (if
exclusive to the EU the test does not apply). If cooperation between different layers of
government were allowed, the test should also comprise a verification of the possibility of
cooperation between those levels of government. Whenever cooperation is feasible, the optimal
level of centralization would be established.
28 Using Inman and Rubinfeld’s (1998) terminology, this would be equivalent to the case of
decentralized federalism, where all governmental activities are initially allocated at the local level
and where states then decide whether to transfer some (or even all) of these competences to a
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In this case, given the states’ diversity of preferences, outcomes would differ
from those reached under centralized subsidiarity.
When the decision to centralize is made at the local level and the unanimous
consent of all member states is required for centralization to occur, the
subsidiarity test would have to be satisfied for each member state. The test for
state i would take the following form:
(12)

Wi ( g i *C ) ≥ Wi ( g i* L )

Equation (12) shows that whenever the total welfare of state i is reduced by
centralization, the subsidiarity test will fail for state i . Under a unanimity rule,
the subsidiarity test in equation (12) has to be passed for all member states, i.e.
for all i = 1,..., N , otherwise the competences will be kept at the local level.
We can show that when the decentralized subsidiarity test in equation (12) is
satisfied for all member states, the centralized subsidiarity test in equation (11) is
also satisfied. This result is rather intuitive: if all member states benefit from
centralization, then the aggregate benefits must outweigh the aggregate costs of
centralization. It is interesting to notice that the opposite is not necessarily true.
Satisfaction of the centralized subsidiarity test in equation (11) does not necessarily
imply satisfaction of the inequalities in expression (12) for all member states.

4.2.3. Case 3: Democratic Subsidiarity Test
Things change when the unanimity rule considered in the case of decentralized
subsidiarity is replaced with a majority rule under democratic subsidiarity. In
order to obtain a majority vote in favor of centralization, equation (12) has to
be satisfied for the majority of member states. Again applying the terminology
in Inman and Rubinfeld (1998), this case is germane to the case of “democratic
federalism” in which the allocation of power among the various levels of
government is decided on the basis of a majority rule.
Under the median voter theorem (Downs, 1957), centralization will occur if the
subsidiarity test is satisfied for the median member state. The test for the
median state (indicated as MED ) takes the following form:
(13)

*C
*L
W MED ( g MED
) ≥ W MED ( g MED
)

central government. The “Early Warning Mechanism” proposed by the European Commission
on May 10th, 2006 and “welcomed” by the European Council, looks like a move towards a
mechanism based on the unanimity rule, if not towards a form of decentralized federalism. The
“early warning mechanism” would render national parliaments “subsidiarity watchdogs.”
According to the mechanism, national parliaments would have the power to raise objections to
EU legislative proposals that they believe violate the principle of subsidiarity (see Cooper, 2006).
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In the case of democratic subsidiarity, we can find situations in which the
satisfaction of the centralized subsidiarity test does not imply satisfaction of the
democratic subsidiarity test. Given that centralization will occur if the subsidiarity
test is satisfied for the median member state, manipulation of the cost and benefit
of centralization for the median state can have important effects.29

5. LOCK-IN EFFECTS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF
SUBSIDIARITY
In this section we consider how the process of centralization is affected by the
subsidiarity principle. Specifically, in Section 5.1., we consider the lock-in
effects that may be created when applying the subsidiarity test to implement
gradual centralization. In Section 5.2 we consider the extent to which these
problems are mitigated or exacerbated by the adoption of one form of
subsidiarity or another. In Section 5.3., we bring these results together. We
consider the conditions that must be satisfied to justify centralization under
centralized, decentralized and democratic subsidiarity. We also provide a
graphical representation of the boundaries of centralization under subsidiarity.

5.1. TRANSFERRING MULTIPLE COMPETENCES: LOCK-IN EFFECTS UNDER
SUBSIDIARITY
When transferring competences, states and unions can choose the number of
activities that they wish to transfer from local to central levels of government
and bundle them accordingly. In this section, we will show that the subsidiarity
test can yield different results according to the way in which the competences
are bundled together.30 In order to illustrate the relevance of bundling, we
model the subsidiarity decision as a function of k , the number of competences
to be allocated at the central level. The case k = 0 corresponds to the case in
which all functions are left to be performed at the local level. In the general
case 1 ≤ k ≤ M , the states and the union consider whether to transfer a bundle
of k competences from the local to the central level. A limiting case in which
k = M corresponds to a situation in which all functions are transferred to the
29 As we will discuss in Section 5.2, given the distribution of costs and benefits of carrying out
the governmental activities among member states, it is possible to identify many instances where
sharing rules can be manipulated strategically at the central level (for instance by the member
states with stronger bargaining power) in order to favor the centralization of a given function.
30 For the purpose of this section, proofs will be developed with reference to the case of
centralized subsidiarity discussed in Section 4.2.1. Qualitatively similar results would hold for the
other subsidiarity tests.

Self-Defeating Subsidiarity / 761

central government at once. The case k = 1 corresponds instead to a stepwise
centralization process, wherein the member states and the union decide to
transfer a single competence from the local to the central level. In all such
cases, the subsidiarity test is applied by considering the costs and benefits of
transferring k competences to the central level.
In the following we use the subsidiarity model developed in the previous
sections to analyze the allocation of competences using different values of k , for
the general case 1 ≤ k ≤ M . The application of the subsidiarity test to the transfer
of the k activities under consideration entails a weighing of the countervailing
effects of centralization. First, the transfer of k activities to the central level has
some potential benefits. One such benefit is given by the exploitation of
economies of scale at the central level when the central government has a cost
advantage as expressed in Definition 1. Another potential benefit is given by the
opportunity to obtain economies of scope at the central level. Starting from a
situation of full decentralization, economies of scope will obviously be small and
will only be created if more than one function is transferred to the central
government, i.e., k > 1 . These benefits from centralization will have to be
weighed against the increased cost that arises due to the foregone economies of
scope at the local level and to the switching costs due to preference heterogeneity.
The comparison of these two countervailing effects of centralization will
determine the outcome of the subsidiarity test.
Proposition 1: In the absence of economies of scope at both central and local levels,
the subsidiarity test will favor centralization, if the Union has a sufficiently large cost
advantage with respect to member States.
Proof: see Appendix
Corollary 1: In the absence of economies of scope, if the Union has a sufficiently
large cost advantage with respect to member States, the subsidiarity test for
centralization will be satisfied for any values of k , with no lock-in effects.
Proof: see Appendix
In the absence of economies of scope, centralization is desirable and will be
chosen under all forms of subsidiarity considered in Section 4.2 if the
allocation of competences to the central level yields sufficiently lower per-unit
costs to compensate for losses that arise due to the heterogeneity of states’
preferences. In these cases, centralization is preferable and will be undertaken
under all values of k . No lock-in effects will be observed. In this case, the
same optimal level of centralization will be reached by proceeding with
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stepwise centralization ( k = 1 ), wholesale centralization of all competences
( k = M ) or any intermediate bundling of centralized competences ( 1 < k < M ).
Proposition 2: If economies of scope are present at both central and local levels,
and in the absence of cost advantage, the subsidiarity test may favor centralization if
the economies of scope at the central level prevail over those at the local level.
Prevailing economies of scope at the central level are a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for satisfaction of the subsidiarity test.
Proof: see Appendix
Corollary 2: In the absence of economies of scale, the presence of economies of scope
at both central and local levels can create lock-in effects for values of k < M .
Proof: see Appendix
Here, unlike what was seen with Proposition 1, we observe the possibility of
lock-in effects. This because, unlike economies of scale, economies of scope at the
central (local) level grow larger as additional functions are centralized
(decentralized). In practical terms, economies of scope are largest when all
functions are concentrated at one level or the other. The first functions that are
moved from the local to the central level are those that suffer the highest loss in
terms of forgone economies of scope. This is self-evident, since at the beginning
of a centralization process, there are more functions that are still at the local level
and with which the centralized functions lose synergies at the local level. This may
lead to situations in which a proposed centralization of functions at an early stage
of centralization fails the subsidiarity test, with a resulting lock-in effect for
subsequent centralization decisions. Lock-in effects can be observed for values of
k < M , but not for the case of wholesale centralization, k = M .
Proposition 3: In the presence of a cost advantage, the subsidiarity test could favor
centralization even if the economies of scope at the local level prevail over those at the
central level. Larger economies of scope at the central level are a necessary but not
sufficient condition for centralization.
Proof: see Appendix
Proposition 4: The lock-in effect is decreasing in the size of k .
Proof: See Appendix.
As discussed above, economies of scope are largest when all functions are
concentrated at one level or the other. All else being equal, the subsidiarity test
is most likely to fail centralization when functions are transferred in a stepwise
fashion, i.e., k = 1 . If a sufficient number of functions are bundled together at
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the time they are transferred to the central level, the economies of scope at the
central level could become strong enough to satisfy the subsidiarity test.
W

Lock-in Effect
under
Subsidiarity

kL

kG

k*

M

Figure 1: Lock-in Effect under Subsidiarity

In Figure 1 we illustrate the case of a lock-in effect caused by the application
of the subsidiarity test. In this example the optimal level of centralization
would be reached at k *. For any current level of centralization k ≤ kL,
however, the subsidiarity principle could prevent the achievement of the
optimal level. Centralization could proceed until k L , but not any further. This
may happen because an incremental transfer of competences to the central
government beyond k L and short of kG would cause a transitional welfare
loss. The transitional welfare loss could only be avoided if a number of
competences k > kG − kL are bundled together and transferred, allowing for a
sudden transition from k L to a point beyond kG with a higher welfare level.
By allowing bundling of a larger number of competences, k , the probability of
a lock-in effect decreases. At the limit ( k = M ) lock-in effects are avoided
because competences could be lumped together at the time of centralization,
allowing any possible move from local to global maxima.
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5.2. THE DOMAIN OF CENTRALIZATION: COMPARING THE THREE FORMS
OF SUBSIDIARITY
We shall now briefly compare the effectiveness of the three forms of
subsidiarity in promoting an optimal level of centralization. We should preface
this discussion by pointing out that the differences in the results of the three
tests of subsidiarity disappear when member states have homogeneous
preferences. As the membership becomes more heterogeneous, the choice of
the form of subsidiarity acquires increasing relevance.
We begin by noting that any reallocation of competences carried out under a
centralized subsidiarity test as defined in (11) will take place only if the aggregate
benefits of centralization outweigh the aggregate costs for all member states. This
is equivalent to a Kaldor-Hicks test of potential compensation. Unlike centralized
subsidiarity, the decentralized subsidiarity test defined in (12) compares, instead,
the individual payoffs for each member state. The decentralized subsidiarity test
also allows reallocation of competences only when no member state suffers a
reduction in welfare from centralization. Any member state could in fact oppose a
centralization proposal that worsens its own welfare. This is equivalent to saying
that centralization will be carried out only if the ensuing equilibrium is Pareto
superior for all member states. Centralization proposals are therefore generally
subjected to a more restrictive test under decentralized subsidiarity. The
satisfaction of the decentralized subsidiarity test becomes harder as the degree of
heterogeneity of member states increases.
The outcomes of decentralized and centralized subsidiarity tend to converge
as appropriate sharing rules are adopted to compensate the effects of
centralization on the welfare of member states.
Lemma 2: Any centralization proposal that satisfies the centralized subsidiarity
test under the condition stated in Proposition 1, 2 or 3 could also satisfy the
decentralized subsidiarity test if an appropriate sharing rule,
N
{ s1 ,..., s N }, ∑ i =1 si = 1 , is adopted.
The result in Lemma 2 is rather intuitive and states that when centralization is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, there must exist a way of redistributing the costs of
centralization among countries that compensates all countries from potential
losses and switching costs.
In cases that satisfy the centralized subsidiarity test in (11), the gainers gain more
than the losers lose. Countries could, therefore, agree on a sharing rule that
compensates the losing states, yet leaves some states better off. This would be
sufficient to satisfy the decentralized subsidiarity test. The choice of appropriate
sharing rules could reduce the share of centralized costs imputed to the losing
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states. If Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is verified for the results given by the centralized
subsidiarity test in (11), there will exist a vector of sharing rules that guarantees
that all member states would favor centralization. If sharing rules can be freely
chosen, reallocation of competences under both centralized and decentralized
subsidiarity will take place when efficient. The opposite also holds such that if the
centralized subsidiarity test cannot be satisfied, there will be no vector of sharing
costs capable of satisfying the decentralized subsidiarity test.31
Lemma 3: Any member state with an intensity of preferences below the average of
the union will benefit from centralization. Any member state above the average will
benefit from centralization only in the presence of a sufficiently large cost advantage.
Proof: Immediate from proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 5: Under the democratic subsidiarity test, centralization will take
place when the median member state has a preference intensity αMED below the
union’s average α . When the median member state has a preference intensity αMED
above the union average α , centralization could only satisfy subsidiarity in the
presence of a sufficiently large cost advantage. Under democratic subsidiarity, an
inefficient centralization decision may be made.
Proof: See the Appendix.
According to Lemma 3, all member countries with lower preferences for
governmental goods α i ≤ α MED gain from centralization, whereas (some)
countries with higher evaluations α i > α MED may not. Centralization does not
necessarily satisfy the democratic subsidiarity test when the median α MED is
above the average α . In this case centralization will pass only if there exists a
sufficiently large cost advantage to render centralization attractive for the
median state. An interesting case occurs when αMED is above α , but the
subsidiarity test condition in (13) is violated for the median voter. In that case,
centralization is rejected because all countries to the right of the median would
oppose it. Under both scenarios, the decision made under the democratic
31 As a practical matter, allowing cost sharing to be adjusted on the basis of preferences opens
the floodgates of preference falsification. Member states would indeed have incentives to engage
in strategic manipulation regarding the knowledge of α i in order to shift a larger share of the
cost of central government to other member states. Therefore, the ideal vector of sharing rules

{s1 ,..., s N },

∑

N

s = 1 may not be achievable in practice because of the strategic behavior

i =1 i

of states. Note however that in the framework considered here, the assumption of observable
α i rules out the case of strategic manipulation.
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subsidiarity test is not necessarily efficient: centralization could be rejected
when efficient or approved when inefficient.

5.3. THE BOUNDARIES OF SUBSIDIARITY
In the following, we list the conditions that will have to be satisfied under the
three forms of subsidiarity for centralization to take place.
Centralized
Subsidiarity Test
jL

Cost advantage

Economies of scope

C j ( g i* L )
αi
< jC
α C j ( Ng *C )

α i ∑ vM≠ j ,v =1 C vL
j
<
α ∑ vk ≠ j ,v =1 C vC
j
jL

Cost advantage
+
Economies of scope

C j ( g i* L )
αi
< jC
α C j ( Ng *C )

+

∑ vM≠ j , v =1 C vL
j
∑ vk ≠ j , v =1 C vC
j

Decentralized
Subsidiarity Test
jL

C j ( g i*L )
αi
< jC
∀i
α C j ( Ng *C )

Democratic
Subsidiarity Test
jL

C j ( g i*L )
α MED
< jC
C j ( Ng *C )
α
N

N

αi
<
α

∑ vM≠ j , v =1 C vL
j
∑ vk ≠ j , v =1 C vC
j

αi
<
α
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C jjC ( Ng *C )

∀i

∑ vM≠ j ,v =1 C vL
α MED
j
< k
∑ v ≠ j ,v =1 C vC
α
j
N

N

+

∑ vM≠ j , v =1 C vL
j

∀i

α MED
α

<

∑ vk ≠ j ,v =1 C vC
j

L )
C jjL ( g *MED

C jjC ( Ng *C )
N

N

Table 1: Conditions for Centralization under Subsidiarity32

The conditions in Table 1 identify the trade-offs among the key factors at play
in the centralization decisions: cost advantage, economies of scope and
heterogeneity of preferences.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of these trade-offs.33 Points above
the three-dimensional function represent a combination of values of heterogeneity
of preferences, cost advantage and scope economies such as to warrant
32 The threshold values for centralization in Table 1 have been derived for the case of equal
sharing of the costs of central government for all member states, si = 1 N .
33 Figure 3 is drawn rewriting the conditions in Table 1 in terms of the variance of preferences.
This follows the concept of heterogeneity used by Alesina and Wacziarg (1999), who define a
country as being composed of a group of individuals who must agree on a set of policies and
who are aligned along a spatial or ideological line. Heterogeneity of preferences is measured as
the average distance of individuals from the center.
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centralization. On the contrary, points below the function are characterized by a
combination of values for which decentralization is desirable.
Cost
Advantage

Heterogeneity
of States

Economies
of Scope

Figure 2: The Boundaries of Subsidiarity

Consistent with the values identified in Table 1, Figure 2 shows that when the
heterogeneity of states’ preferences increases, higher values of cost advantage
and/or economies of scope become necessary in order to justify centralization.
Likewise, the vertical section of our three-dimensional function shrinks as we
move closer to the origin, inasmuch as even a small cost advantage and/or small
economies of scope at the central level are sufficient to make centralization
attractive when membership to the union is highly homogeneous.

6. EXCESSIVE CENTRALIZATION UNDER
SUBSIDIARITY?
The subsidiarity principle was formally adopted as a constitutional principle of
the European Union to limit excessive centralization and to ensure that the
reallocation of functions to the central level would occur only when
centralization added value over and above what member states or individuals
could achieve by acting at the local level.
In the previous analysis we have shown that, when starting from a situation of
complete decentralization, the subsidiarity principle may create some lock-in
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effects that prevent desirable centralization. In the following, we will show that
the effects of subsidiarity change, however, and are possibly reversed if we start
from a situation similar to that faced by the European Union in 1992, in which
several functions were previously centralized and in which the proposed
centralization of additional functions became subject to the subsidiarity test.

6.1. APPLYING THE SUBSIDIARITY TEST AFTER THE CENTRALIZATION OF
AN INITIAL BUNDLE OF COMPETENCES
The subsidiarity principle was adopted by the European Union in 1992, after a
fairly large number of competences had already been transferred on the basis
of political decisions and in the absence of a blueprint for the expansion.34 As
discussed in Section 2.1, the competences that had been centralized prior to
1992 ranged vastly in their nature. Examples include the functions that were
transferred in 1958 by Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty, such as the
establishment of a common external tariff and commercial policy, the removal
of barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, the
creation of common Community policy in key areas of the economy, such as
agriculture and transport, the coordination of economic and monetary policy,
the “harmonization” of the laws of the Member States to help the common
market, the creation of a European Social Fund and a European Investment
Bank, the improvement of employment opportunities and facilitation of the
expansion of the Community, and the association with overseas countries and
territories to increase trade.35 In 1986, the Single European Act expanded
competences to entirely new fields of activity, including research, finance,
economic convergence, social policy and environment.
In the following, we analyze the effects of subsidiarity when applied after an
initial set of competences has been transferred to the central government on
the basis of political decision-making. We will show that the subsidiarity test is
affected by pre-existing centralization decisions in quite substantial ways.

34 Although previously invoked as a general principle of good governance, the formal adoption
of the subsidiarity principle by the European Union came at a point where several important
functions had already been allocated at the central level as part of the exclusive competence of
the Union. Since the founding of the European Community, centralization of competences has
progressed in a piecemeal fashion in the absence of a blueprint for the ultimate objective of the
Union and of any formal analysis of the costs and benefits of centralization (Land, 1991).
35 For an account of the growth of these competences from 1958 to 1992, see Flaherty and
Lally-Green (1996) and Streit and Mussler (1994).
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Proposition 6: An over-centralization problem may arise when the subsidiarity
test is adopted after an initial bundle of competences is already centralized.
Proof: See Appendix.
Whether we start from a situation of complete decentralization, or we apply the
subsidiarity test at a later stage when a bundle of competences has been
previously assigned to the central government, the application of a subsidiarity
test may fail to generate an optimal allocation of policy responsibilities across
different levels of government. The initial bundle of centralized competences
could in fact create economies of scope and attract additional competences.
This may create an over-centralization problem if some of those functions
could have been carried out more effectively at the local level. These functions
may have been brought to the central level as an effect of the economies of
scope generated by the initial bundle of competences at the central level. In
Section 5 we saw that a lock-in effect may occur when an initial transfer of
competences is evaluated under subsidiarity. A symmetrical problem can be
found when the subsidiarity test is adopted after an initial wave of
centralization. The symmetrical problem would be one of over-centralization.
Unlike the lock-in effects considered in the previous sections, we observe in
this symmetrical problem a trend towards progressive centralization, with a
potential equilibrium characterized by excessive levels of centralization.
Figure 3 illustrates the process of excessive centralization that may be
triggered when an initial set of competences, ko , is centralized on the basis of
political decision-making and where the centralization of additional
competences is subjected to the subsidiarity test.
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Figure 3: Self-Defeating Subsidiarity

The proposed centralization of any number of competences beyond the point
ko would increase welfare and would therefore satisfy the subsidiarity test. In
the scenario considered in Figure 3, this would bring us further away from the
global maximum, k * , leading to progressive centralization well beyond the
optimal level of centralization. The preexisting centralization of competences
in this example has important effects on the subsequent application of the
subsidiarity test, leading to a path-dependent evolution of governance.
The above analysis may provide an explanation for the paradox of progressive
centralization observed by Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005). Contrary
to its stated goal of preventing excessive centralization, in the specific context
in which it was introduced in the EU, the subsidiarity principle triggered a
mechanism favoring further centralization. This mechanism is strongly path
dependent and, once started, may lead to levels of centralization that yield
lower aggregate benefits than the preexisting decentralized regime. Although
the subsidiarity principle is still too young to allow for a significant empirical
verification of our hypothesis, our conjecture is that once some functions
become centralized, further centralization becomes easier. Further
centralization may, in fact, become unavoidable. This hypothesis is consistent
with the preliminary evidence presented by Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht,
who date the period of most intense centralization to the 1990s – ironically at a
time when subsidiarity was adopted and raised to the rank of a constitutional
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principle of the European Union. The range of competences reallocated to the
central level spanned along the new boundaries of a political, economic and
monetary union, which have grown larger and stronger on the foundations laid
by the Maastricht Treaty, subsidiarity principle notwithstanding.

6.2. DEVOLUTION UNDER SUBSIDIARITY
Although the objective of the subsidiarity principle was to constrain the future
expansion of the Union through excessive centralization of competences, the
European Commission, soon after its adoption, staged a demonstration of the
constraining effects of subsidiarity by undertaking a review of existing
Community legislation for conformity with the subsidiarity principle. The
review was completed and a list of initiatives to be withdrawn or modified in
light of the subsidiarity test was presented to the European Council (Marquardt,
1994). The list and the actions that followed were not impressive, and only three
proposed directives were withdrawn and six more revised on subsidiarity
grounds (Bermann, 1994).36 However, in drawing up this list, the Commission
validly asserted the principle that the subsidiarity test could be applied
retrospectively, allowing devolution of previously centralized functions.37 The
possibility of a retrospective application of the subsidiarity principle was
subsequently reaffirmed by a protocol added by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
which under Article 3 stated: “Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be
applied in the light of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It allows Community
action within the limits of its powers to be expanded where circumstances so
require, and conversely, to be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer
justified.”38 Although the use of the subsidiarity principle for devolution
purposes has rarely been observed in recent years, the possibility of devolution
through subsidiarity acquires particular symbolic value, given the lack of a

36 Bermann (1994) notes that the Commission evidently proceeded in the daunting task of
legislative review believing that in matters of politics, actions speak louder than words. Much of
the action, however, affected pending legislative proposals, rather than existing legislation and
allocation of competences that had taken place prior to 1992. The European Commission
subsequently withdrew additional legislative proposals. This possibly discouraged yet other
initiatives and unborn proposals on subsidiarity grounds.
37 The use of subsidiarity principle for devolution purposes is limited by the fact that
subsidiarity only applies to situations of shared competence and does not apply to areas in which
the EU has exclusive jurisdiction. In practical terms, subsidiarity could not return authority to the
member states where the union has taken over a given competence entirely.
38 The Treaty of Amsterdam signed on October 2, 1997, and entered into force on May 1,
1999, amended the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht).
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secession opportunity for member states within the Union (Weiler, 1985).39 The
possibility that there might be devolution of competences from the central
government back to the states acquires particular relevance in enhancing the
understanding of the effects of subsidiarity in our model.
In the following, we consider the application of subsidiarity for the
devolution of competences from the central government back to the states.
Proposition 6 showed that progressive centralization is the likely outcome of
an ongoing process of centralization under subsidiarity. This conclusion should
be revisited in light of the possibility of devolution.
Proposition 7: The over-centralization problem identified in Proposition 6 is
mitigated if the subsidiarity test could be applied to the devolution of previously
centralized competences.
Proof: See Appendix.
Propositions 1 and 2 apply to the case of devolution of previously centralized
competences through subsidiarity. In the absence of economies of scope at
both central and local levels, the subsidiarity test will favor devolution of
previously centralized functions if the states have a comparative advantage. In
this case the subsidiarity test for devolution will be satisfied for any value of k ,
with no lock-in effects. Also in this case, the subsidiarity test will be able to
lead to contraction of the central government and to bring the allocation of
competences back to an optimal level of centralization, either by proceeding
with stepwise devolution ( k = 1 ), wholesale devolution of competences
( k = k 0 ) or any intermediate form of devolution ( 1 < k < k 0).
Proposition 8: The lock-in effect identified in Corollary 2 will also affect
devolution through subsidiarity for values ( k < k 0 ).
Proof: See Appendix.
When economies of scope are present at both central and local levels, lock-in
effects may be observed for cases of partial devolution ( k < k 0 ). The
possibility of lock-in effects is due to the fact that economies of scope at the
local level grow larger as additional functions are decentralized. When applying
the subsidiarity test for devolution, the first functions that are reallocated back
to the local level would create larger losses in terms of foregone economies of
scope at the central level. Similar to what was observed under Proposition 2,
39 Weiler (1985) points out that the EC treaty provisions suggest rather strongly that
contraction of the EU can be negotiated, but not claimed as the right of any member state.
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this may lead to situations where a proposed devolution of functions will not
satisfy the subsidiarity test, with a resulting lock-in effect which may lead to the
persistence of an excessive level of centralization. This lock-in effect could be
overcome if multiple competences are simultaneously reallocated to the state
level, tilting the balance of economies of scope in favor of states.

7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that the principle of subsidiarity can lead to a
path-dependent reallocation of policy responsibilities and have mixed effects
for the achievement of an efficient level of centralization. After modeling the
decision process under three alternative forms of subsidiarity, we observed in
Section 5 that lock-in effects may prevent a gradual transition towards efficient
levels of centralization. Stepwise reallocation of competences is most sensitive
to these lock-in effects. The application of the subsidiarity test in the initial
steps of the process may turn subsidiarity into a myopic policy instrument,
especially when stepwise centralization is undertaken. Subsidiarity can also
create the opposite problem of over-centralization. In Section 6, we showed
that the adoption of subsidiarity by an already-centralized union may have
perverse effects, favoring further centralization rather than putting a limit to it.
This may have path-dependent effects on later centralization decisions.
These two results reveal that the timing of the subsidiarity test is crucial to
determine the final level of centralization and whether lock-in effects or overcentralization problems are likely to emerge. When lock-in or over-centralization
problems arise, subsidiarity may lead to a local, rather than a global, maximum.
These findings are consistent with the particular patterns of centralization of
distinct areas, such as social protection or agricultural policy, with strong
heterogeneity of preferences but dominant scope economies. These findings are
also consistent with the observed lack of centralization of other areas, such as
defense and environmental protection, which have remained in the local domain
notwithstanding the strong economies of scale achievable at the central level. As
the now-young principle of subsidiarity comes of age, future scholars will have an
opportunity to investigate empirically the extent to which lock-in or overcentralization problems have affected the process of unification of governmental
functions in the European context.
Our analysis left out the constitutional economy aspect of the issue and the
analysis of political agency costs. Centralization may have a substantial impact
on the individuals and groups that hold diverse minoritarian preferences, or in
regimes with imperfect democratic decision-making. With ongoing
centralization, citizens are confronted with rising agency problems. Democratic
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control and political accountability are being weakened. This factor creates an
additional trade-off between the benefits and costs of centralization. This
trade-off may weigh more heavily toward centralization or decentralization,
depending on the area of competence under consideration. These varying costs
and benefits of centralization play a major role in the European Union, because
of its so-called democratic deficit. These costs and benefits should be
considered and explicitly modeled in further extensions of our analysis.
Further theoretical extensions should give greater emphasis to the strategic
dimension of subsidiarity. This will give a clearer understanding of who may be
the potential gainers and losers from decisions on reallocation under different
subsidiarity rules, and of how these distributive effects might influence the
outcome of allocation decisions made under different voting rules. Further
analyses should also evaluate the robustness of subsidiarity to changes in
membership and size of the union, as well as changes in the level of heterogeneity
of member states. The enlargement of the union may affect the optimality of
previous centralization decisions in two main ways. First, diseconomies of scale
may result from an expansion of the union. Second, and more importantly, the
union may grow more heterogeneous as membership expands. The opportunity
to apply subsidiarity for devolution purposes may become a critical instrument to
allow the thinning of some centralized competences in response to an expansion
in membership and diversity within the union. Additionally, the optimal size and
membership in the union may be endogenous to the rules that govern the process
of allocation of competences and the choice of a proper form of subsidiarity may
be vital to fostering a healthy expansion of the union.
The model could also be extended to consider the strategic manipulation of
the functions that are proposed for centralization. Several related issues may be
relevant in this setting. First, as discussed in this paper, cost sharing rules can
be used to manipulate the costs and benefits of centralization for the relevant
states, affecting the outcomes of subsidiarity. Cost sharing rules, however, can
have important redistributive effects, and different forms of subsidiarity may
be more or less conducive to such redistributive manipulations. Second, the
number of governmental functions is often endogenously determined. Under
different voting rules, we may observe an expansion or a restriction of the
activities that fall under the shared competences of states and union. Finally,
agenda setting may have important effects in the process of progressive
centralization considered in this paper. Agenda setters may facilitate
centralization by bundling a subset of functions that enhance the opportunities
of absorption of additional functions at a later stage. On the other hand,
agenda setters may also block desirable centralization, centralizing an initial
bundle of competences that will produce lock-in effects in the future. In either

Self-Defeating Subsidiarity / 775

case, agenda manipulation can lead to a less than optimal allocation of
governmental functions. Future extensions should further consider the
possible role of imperfect information and the effect of strategic bargaining on
the outcomes of centralization under our three rules. These considerations and
extensions will hopefully shed some light on the practical effectiveness of
subsidiarity and offer a valuable basis for evaluating its desirability and
exploring alternative formulations of this concept.

Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The optimization problem for the central government and of each member
state i in case of partial centralization of k competences requires the
satisfaction of the first order conditions (9) and (10) without the term referring
to the economies of scope
N

(9’)

∑α H
i

j

( g Cj ) = NC jjC ( Ng *C ); j = 1, ..., k

i =1

(10’)

α i H j ( g ij* D ) = C jjL ( g i* D ); j = k + 1,..., M ; i = 1,..., N

We can immediately see that, in the absence of economies of scope, the first
order conditions in (4) and (10) coincide. Hence g *j D = g *j L ; j = k + 1,..., M
Expression (9’) can be rewritten as
(9’’)

H j (g ) =
*C
j

where α = ∑ i =1
N

αi

C jjL ( N g *C )

α
is the average α in the population of member states.

N

Comparing expressions (9’’) and (10’) it can be seen that g *j C > gij*L iff
(14)

C jjL ( g i* L )
αi
<
α C jjC ( Ng *C )
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Under the condition of cost advantage defined in (6), the r.h.s. of condition
(14) is always bigger than one. Hence, g *j C > gij* L whenever α i < 1 , i.e.
α
whenever α i < α . When α i > α condition (14) is not automatically satisfied.
Satisfaction requires that the degree of heterogeneity (measured by the percent
distance of α i from the mean) is lower than the percentage cost savings, i.e.
(15)

jL
*L
jC
*C
α i − α C j ( g i ) − C j ( Ng ) .
<
α
C jjC ( Ng *C )

The total welfare of a single state and of the union can be derived by
integrating the FOC over the range (0, g *L ) in the case of full decentralization
and (0, g *C ) in the case of partial centralization. The marginal benefits for
states and union coincide, while the marginal costs of supplying the
governmental goods differ. Under the assumption of a comparative cost
advantage for the union, the net marginal benefit is higher for the union for
any unit produced up to g *j L . Over the range ( g )*jL , g *jC the welfare of
member states will not increase (since those units are not produced under
decentralization), whereas the welfare of the union will increase by positive but
decreasing amounts up to the optimal level of zero. This is true for any j .
Therefore g *jC > g *j L implies that:
N

W C ( g *C ) ≥

∑W ( g
i

*L
i )

i =1

If condition (14) is not satisfied, some countries with α i > α will then have

g *j C < gij*L . Nonetheless, centralization may still be efficient if the gains from
centralization (represented by cost savings and increase in welfare due to
g *jC > g *j L for α i ≤ α ) outweigh the loss due to centralization (represented by
forgone welfare due to g *jC < g *j L for α i > α ). In analytical terms:
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g *j L

∑ ∫ (C
α α
(16)

i≤

( g j ) − C ( g j )) + ∑

jL
j

jC
j

+∑

∫ (α H
i

α i ≤α g * L
j

j

∫ (C

α i >α 0

0

g *j C

g *j C

( g j ) − C ( g j )) ≥ ∑
jC
j

jL
j

( g j ) − C jjC ( g j )) +

g *j L

∫ (C

α i >α g * C
j

jL
j

( g j ) − C jjC ( g j ))

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
In the absence of a cost advantage, the union and the member states have the
same marginal cost. If the following condition is satisfied:
M

(17)

αi
<
α

∑

*L
C vL
j ( g MED )

v ≠ j ,v =1
k

∑

C vj C ( Ng *C )

v ≠ j , v =1

Then g *j C = g *j L ; j = 1,..., k . In the presence of prevailing economies of scope
M

at the central level ∑

*L
C vL
j ( g MED )

∑

*C
C vC
)
j ( Ng

v ≠ j ,v =1
k

>1

.

v ≠ j , v =1

As with condition (14), condition (17) is automatically satisfied whenever α i < α
or whenever there is a lower degree of heterogeneity with respect to cost savings
for α i > α . However condition (17) is necessary but not sufficient for
centralization. In the absence of cost advantage, the member states will choose
g ij*D < g ij*L , j = k + 1, K , M

since under full decentralization the member states rely on economies of scope
on all M functions for any level of g i . Centralization may still be efficient if
the gains from centralization (represented by cost savings and increase in
welfare due to g *jC > g *j L for j = 1,..., k ) outweigh the loss due to
centralization (represented by forgone welfare due to g *j D > g *j L for

j = k + 1,..., M ). In analytical terms:
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g *j D

M

∑

k
 jC

vC
C vL
j − si  C j + ∑ C j ) ≥
v ≠ j , v =1
v ≠ j ,v =1



M

∫(∑
0

v ≠ j , v =1

M

∑

C vL
j −

M

∑

C vL
j )

v ≠ j , v = k +1

Notwithstanding the presence of economies of scope, a lock-in effect may be
observed, that may preclude efficient centralization for values of k < M , with:
N

W C ( g *C ) <

∑W ( g
i

*L
i )

i =1

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Under centralized subsidiarity, in the presence of a cost advantage and
prevailing economies of scope at the central level, centralization will be carried
out if the condition (19)
M

(19)

∑

C j ( gij )
αi
< jC
+
α C j ( Ng *C )
jL

*L

*L
C vL
j ( g ij )

v ≠ j , v =1
k

∑

*C
C vC
)
j ( Ng

v ≠ j ,v =1

and condition (18) are satisfied. As in the previous Proposition, condition (19)
is necessary but not sufficient for centralization to satisfy subsidiarity.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The lock-in effect is caused by the fact that by transferring competences from
the local to the central level, economies of scope at the local level are weakened.
This implies that when competences stay at the local level, the marginal cost of
production rises, and therefore the public good arising from those functions
provided by the local government will diminish (as shown in proof of
Proposition 3). We can therefore measure the lock-in effect as the proportional
increase in marginal cost at the local level following the centralization process
(with respect to the case of full decentralization, i.e. k = 0 ).
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∑ vM( ≠ j )=k +1 C vL
j (gi )
∑ vM( ≠ j )=1 C vL
j (gi )
It is plain that the ratio is decreasing in k , and becomes zero (no lock-in
effect) when the centralization process is realized in one step, setting k = M .

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Under democratic subsidiarity, according to the median voter theorem,
centralization will be carried out if the following condition (analogous to (19))
is satisfied for the median member state:
M

(20)

α MED
<
+
α
sMEDC jjC ( Ng *C )
jL
j

C (g

*L
MED

)

∑

*L
C vL
j ( g MED )

v ≠ j ,v =1
k

∑

C vj C ( Ng *C )

v ≠ j ,v =1

Applying Lemma 3 to the democratic subsidiarity test, centralization will always
be carried out when the median α MED is below the average α . In that case, all
member countries with lower preferences for governmental goods α i ≤ α MED
gain from centralization, whereas (some) countries with higher evaluations
α i > α MED may not. Centralization does not necessarily satisfy the democratic
subsidiarity test when the median α MED is above the average α . In this case
centralization requires condition (20) to be satisfied for the median state and
condition below (analogous to (16)) to hold:
L
g *MED
,j

(21)

∫

L
g *MED
,j

(C ( g j ) − sMED C ( g j )) ≥
jL
j

0

jC
j

∫

(α MED H j ( g j ) − C jjC ( g j ))

g *j C

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
The proof follows directly from Propositions 2 and 4. Consider the case in
which the union has centralized k1 competences and each member state is
asked to vote in favor of the centralization of a second bundle of k 2
governmental activities. The optimization problem for the central government
and for each member state i in the case of an additional partial centralization
of k 2 competences requires the satisfaction of the following first order
conditions:
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k2
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vC ( Ng C ) j
j

= 1,..., k

v ( ≠ j ) =1
M

(12’)

∑

α i H j ( g iD ) = C jjL ( g iD ) +

D
C vL
j ( g i ) j = 1,..., k ; i = 1,..., N

v ( ≠ j ) = k 2 +1

The optimization problem for the central government and of each member
state i in case of partial centralization of the first bundle of k1 competences
requires the satisfaction of the following first order conditions:
k1

N

(11”)

∑α H
i

C
j ( gi )

=

NC jjC ( Ng C ) +

N

i =1

∑C

vC ( Ng C ) j
j

= 1,..., k

v ( ≠ j ) =1
M

(12”)

αi H

D
j ( gi )

=

∑

C jjL ( g iD ) +

D
C vL
j ( g i ) j = 1,..., k ; i = 1,..., N

v ( ≠ j ) = k1 +1

It appears immediately from Proposition 4 that the lock-in effect is reduced at
the second round of centralization, i.e.

∑ vM( ≠ j ) = k

2 +1

C vL
j ( gi )

∑ vM( ≠ j ) =1 C vL
j ( gi )

<

∑ vM( ≠ j ) = k

1 +1

C vL
j ( gi )

∑ vM( ≠ j ) =1 C vL
j ( gi )

Economies of scope at the central level are bigger, since a higher number of
governmental activities equal to k1 + k 2 is now carried out centrally. This
follows from the fact that the reduction in marginal cost at the central level is
higher after an initial block of competences is transferred at the central level,
fostering progressive centralization. Namely:
k1

∑

C vC
j ( Ng )
v ( ≠ j ) =1

k2

<

∑C

vC ( Ng )
j

v ( ≠ ) =1

Note that the proof is derived under the assumption of monotonicity in the
economies of scope, i.e. we assume away the case where, after some
competences are centralized, the central government begins experiencing
diseconomies of scale.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Same as in Proposition 1, 2 and 3 when you reduce k .

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Same as in Proposition 2 and Corollary when you reduce k .
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